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Abstract
We take a diﬀerential game approach to study the dynamic market interaction
between two Internet Service Providers (ISP) oﬀering services characterized by
diﬀerent quality levels. Web congestion is accounted for, consisting in the fact
that for a given network capacity, i.e. for given amount of resources to be shared,
the quality of services decreases with the number of customers. ISP ﬁrms, by
accumulating capital, may invest in order to increase their own network capacity.
In contrast with the acquired wisdom, we prove that there exists an admissible in-
tertemporal parameters subset wherein the low quality ﬁrm performs better than
the high quality ﬁrm in terms of equilibrium proﬁts. Furthermore, we establish
conditions under which the low quality ﬁrm becomes a natural monopolist. Fi-
nally, we prove that consumers may be better oﬀ under cooperative rather than
under non cooperative play.
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1. Introduction
Many network goods, among which communication and information network goods, feature
two characteristics: (i) there are positive network externalities, consisting in the fact that the
utility an user can draw from the purchaise of such goods is increasing in the total number
of others doing likewise; (ii) there is any intrinsic utility that can be justiﬁed by itself
consumption, since being connected to the network when none can be reached is completely
unuseful. Furthermore, some of them may suﬀer from congestion phenomena, to the extent
to which users share a common technology. In this respect, think about phones, faxes and
telegraphs. These are circuit-switched communication services, which means that a ﬁxed
percentage of network resources is reserved for the call, and no other call can use those
resources until the original connection is closed. But emails, Internet telephony, Internet fax
and video conferencing, to name a few, make use of the Internet, which is a shared-media
technology. As a consequence, these are services subject to web congestion: for a given
network capacity, i.e. for given amount of resources to be shared, the quality of service
(QoS) decreases as the traﬃc ﬂow increases.1
Nowadays, we register an exponential increase in the demand for communication services
through the Internet, and we expect it to grow more and more in next years. The Federal
Communication Commission reports that on the Internet the volume of traﬃc is doubling
every 90-100 days, while the growth rate of telephone traﬃc is around 5 per cent a year!
Moreover, we observe an increase in the demand for new services like internet telephony,
video-conferencing and on-line multiplayer games, which require a much larger band-width
than simple emails or web chats do. All these factors, make web congestion a no more
negligeable danger as far as sustainable web growth is concerned.2
Ever since Rohlfs’ contribution (1974), the economic literature dealing with network
industries has dramatically grown.3 Several pricing mechanism have been proposed in order
to cope with congestion, from ﬂat pricing to much more complex schemes based on auctions
over packets or on priority pricing.4 However, the problem of traﬃc ”accountability” on
the Web has prevented regulators from their practical implementation. On the supply side,
1 The quality of service on the Web can be measured as the expected waiting time or the expected loss rate
for data transfers.
2 Furthermore, the transmission protocol adopted for the Internet was not engineered to manage congestion
eﬀects.
3 An exhaustive survey on markets characterized by network eﬀects is in Katz and Shapiro (1994). For a
good exposition of many problems concerning competition and regulation in Telecommunication Industries
see Laﬀont and Tirole (1999) and Shy (2001). A focus on information network goods is in Shapiro and
Varian (1999).
4 See DaSilva (2000) and Falkner (2000) et al. for surveys on congestion pricing.
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the issue of capacity upgrades as a way to match the increasing demand has been exlored
by Mackey-Mason and Varian (1995), within a static setting. As to the interplay between
network eﬀects and the provision of product quality, contributions have been made by Baake
and Boom (2001), Bental and Spiegel (1995) and Lambertini and Orsini (2001), either in
duopoly or in monopoly models. With reference to the Internet, Crémer et al. (2000)
and Laﬀont et al. (2001) have focussed on positive network externalities, while Gibbons
et al. (2000) and Mason (2000), have shed some light on congestion phenomena under
competition.5
To the best of our knowledge, little has been done to gather both positive and negative
network externalities in a uniﬁed framework. Yet, it seems to us that the comprehension of
congestion eﬀects be essential to completing the broad economic picture referred to network
goods, both on positive and normative standpoint. In addition to this, despite their actual
relevance, very few papers have studied the economic incentives for ﬁrms to invest in network
capacity in relation with the choice of which variety to oﬀer.
Aiming to provide a theoretical contribution in these directions, we study a diﬀeren-
tial duopoly game where ﬁrms, either non cooperatively or cooperatively, oﬀer informa-
tion/communication services characterized by diﬀerent qualitity levels through congestible
networks and, by accumulating capital, invest in order to improve their own transmission
technologies. This is equivalent to building up network capacity: if for a given data pack-
age to be transferred less common resources are needed, new customers may enter without
negatively aﬀecting the conditions of others’ usage.
We assume that heterogeneous consumers base their choice of which services subscribing
to on the connection price and the quality of services oﬀered. Consumers’ decisions are also
based on the expected number of subscribers to each networks, with expectations supposed
to be rational. In line with the existing static literature on product quality provision in
oligopoly (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Lehmann-
Grube, 1997, inter alia), we show that the high quality ﬁrm serves more customers and invests
more than the low quality ﬁrm. However, the order relationship between proﬁts can take
a diﬀerent sign than the one we are accomplished with from the aforementioned literature.
More precisely, there exists an admissible intertemporal parameters subset wherein the low
quality ﬁrm performs better than the high quality ﬁrm in terms of equilibrium proﬁts. This
occurs whenever future proﬁts matter enough. Moreover, we argue that it may be the case
in which the low quality ﬁrm becomes a natural monopolist. As to the cooperative play, we
5 More technical literature has studied several protocols to cope with web congestion. For an easy to read
exposition of some relevant issues see Vorthman (1999) and the references therein. At a level more tailored
to telecommunications engineers, see Kohler et al. (2003).
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ﬁnd that the multi-product cartel invests less, sells less, and provides lower quality levels of
both varieties than the duopoly does.
Before turning to the model formulation, we would like to underline that, although our
leading example is the Internet, the theoretical framework provided in this paper could be
applied to the studying of all those markets for vertically diﬀerentiated goods characterized
by positive network externalities and congestion phenomena, where ﬁrms invest so as to
increase capacity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the model is laid out in section 2;
section 3 deals with non cooperative play, while section 4 deals with cooperative play, i.e. a
full cartelization. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2. Model Formulation
Time is continous and, as usual, indicated by t. At each t ∈ [0,∞) a market for network
services exists. Let this market be supplied by two single-product ﬁrms oﬀering network
services of on-net quality qi (t) in a number of units xi (t) at a connection price pi (t), with
i = {H,L}, ∞ > qH (t) ≥ qL (t) ≥ 0 ∀t. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
oﬀ-net quality is nil, meaning that consumers’ satisfaction from joining network i is totally
independent from network j. This is the same assumption as in Mackey-Mason and Varian
(1995). Moreover, we abstract from the presence of switching costs, so customers that, as
time goes by, switch from one variety to the other, bear any disutility.6 Each consumer
is characterized by a willingness to pay θ, uniformly distributed over the support [θ − 1, θ],
with θ > 1. Without any loss of generality, assume f(θ) = 1, so that consumers’ population
is normalized to 1.7
The situation modelled here is one where consumers utility from subscribing to a given
network service is positively aﬀected by the expected number of others subscribing to the
same. We deﬁne the instantaneous net surplus a consumer of type θ draws from the variety
characterized by qi (t) as:
Uθ (t) =

[θ + qH(t)− pH(t)]x
e
H (t) if she subscribes to service H
[sθ + qL(t)− pL(t)]x
e
L (t) if she subscribes to service L
0 if she does not subscribe to any service
(1)
where xei (t) is consumers’ expected number of subscribers to service i at time t, and s is a
time-invariant real parameter. It is worth noting that, in order to ensure a higher willingness
6 For a good survey on consumers’ switching costs see Klemperer (1995).
7 At each point in time, each consumer buys at most one unit of the preferred quality. This rules out the
use of second-degree price discrimination.
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to pay for the high quality service, s ∈ (0, xeH (t) /x
e
L (t)).
8 (1) is such that if a consumer
subscribe to a service but only a negligible part of the population does likewise, her utility
tends to zero. This amounts to saying that the intrinsic utility that can be justiﬁed by itself
consumption is nil.9
In order to derive the expressions of market demands, we compute the threshold of θ
which characterizes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between subscribing to the high quality
service and subscribing to the low quality service:
θ̂ (t) =
xeH (t) (pH (t)− qH (t))− x
e
L (t) (pL (t)− qL (t))
xeH (t)− sx
e
L (t)
(2)
and the one which characterizes the consumer who is indiﬀerent between subscribing to the
low quality service and not subscribing at all:
θ˜ (t) =
pL (t)− qL (t)
s
(3)
The direct demand system follows:
xH (t) = θ − θ̂ (t) (4)
xL (t) = θ̂ (t)− θ˜ (t) (5)
Notice that θ˜ (t) does not contain neither xeL nor x
e
H , implying that the individual decision
whether to subscribe to service L, contrasted with the alternative not to subscribe to any
service, does not depend on others’ decisions. As to θ̂ (t), things are more involved, in that
it clearly becomes crucial the way consumers form their expectations. In this respect, let us
make the following assumption:
Axiom 1 Consumers have a perfect foresight. Formally: xei (t) = xi (t) ∀t, i = {H,L}.
The above axiom guarantees that, in the ﬁxed-point equilibrium, expectations about
prices and network sizes turn out to be correct.
In order to deal with quantity competition, we need to explicitly solve the system (4-5)
for prices. This can be done as long as partial market coverage prevails, which amounts to
requiring that θ˜ (t) > 0:
pH(t) = θ + qH(t)− xH(t)− s
[xL (t)]
2
xH (t)
(6)
8 Parameter s is so introduced in order not to restrict the spectrum of admissible cases to xe
H
≥ xe
L
.
9 Such an assumption is particularly appropriate for information and communication networks.
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pL(t) = qL (t) + s
[
θ − xH (t)− xL (t)
]
(7)
The above demand system is well speciﬁed iﬀ θ̂ (t) > θ˜ (t). From a direct comparison between
the two thresholds, it is easy to assess that last inequality holds for all s ∈ (0, xH (t) /xL (t)),
that is, in the entire admissible parameter range. Notice also that, in this range, pH(t) and
pL(t) are always positive.
On the supply side, production entails the following instantaneous cost, convex in the
current quality level:
Ci (t) = cxi (t) + [qi (t)]
2 (8)
Since (8) is separable in xi (t) and qi (t), quality improvements entail ﬁxed costs.
10 Without
any loss of generality, we normalize marginal costs to zero.
Instantaneous proﬁts then write:
Πi(t) = pi(t)xi (t)− [qi (t)]
2 − [ki (t)]
2 (9)
where [ki (t)]
2 is the instantaneous quadratic cost of investing to build up own network
capacity, ki (t)being the amount of capital devoted by ﬁrm i at time t.
We assume that the evolution of QoS depends positively from the investment of a ﬁrm
in its network capacity and negatively from the total amount of consumers using the same
network. Consider the following linear state equation:
∂qi (t)
∂t
=
·
qi (t) = ki(t)− δxi(t) (10)
where δ > 0 is the constant decay rate. (10) reﬂects the basic congestion property of com-
munication and information networks: for a given network capacity, the higher the number
of customers using the network (more precisely, the more data packages are transferred),
the higher the expected delay or the loss rate. On the other hand, for a given number of
customers using the network, the larger the network capacity, the lower the expected delay
or the loss rate. It is worth considering the above kinematic equation together with (1).
A given increase in xei (t) yields two opposite eﬀects: (i) a direct increase in Uθ (t), i.e. a
positive network eﬀect; (ii) an indirect decrease in Uθ (t) due to a decrease in qi(t), i.e. a
congestion eﬀect.
The object of ﬁrm i is to maximize the present value of its proﬁt stream over an inﬁnite
time horizon:
Πi(t) =
∫
∞
0
πi(t)e
−ρtdt (11)
10For models where quality improvements entail ﬁxed costs see Aoki and Prusa (1997) and Lehmann-Grube
(1997). Motta (1993) provides a comparative evaluation between variable and ﬁxed costs.
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w.r.t. controls xi(t) and ki(t), under the constraint given by (10). The discount rate ρ > 0
is assumed to be constant and common to both ﬁrms.
In order to evaluate the industry performance in terms of welfare, we adopt the following
welfare function:
W (t) = ΠH(t) + ΠL(t) + CS(t) (12)
where CS(t) is the instantaneous consumer surplus:
CS(t) =
θ∫
θ̂
UH (t) dθ +
θ̂∫
θ˜
UL (t) dθ = xHsx
2
L +
1
2
(
x3H + sx
3
L
)
(13)
3. Markov Perfect Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
Firm i′s current value Hamiltonian function writes:
Hi(t) = e
−ρt
[
πi(t) + λii(t)
·
qi +λij(t)
·
qj
]
(14)
First order conditions (FOCs) on controls are (henceforth, time index is omitted for brevity):11
∂HH
∂xH
= 0⇒ xH =
1
2
(
θ + qH − δλHH
)
(15)
∂HL
∂xL
= 0⇒ xL =
1
2s
[
s
(
θ + xH
)
+ qL − δλLL
]
(16)
∂Hi
∂ki
= 0⇒ λii = 2ki (17)
The above FOCs are such that the present game produces Markov perfect open-loop Nash
equilibria, i.e. equilibria which are subgame perfect.12 Notice also that conditions (15-16-
17) do not contain λij because of the separated dynamics assumed in the model. Therefore,
we set λij = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞) and j = i, and specify only one co-state equation per ﬁrm:
∂HH
∂qH
= −2qH + xH = ρλHH−
·
λHH (18)
∂HL
∂qL
= −2qL + xL = ρλLL−
·
λLL (19)
11Second order conditions are in the Appendix.
12See, e.g., Mehlman and Willig (1983), Reinganum (1982), Dockner, Feichtinger and JØrgensen (1985)
and Fershtman (1987). For an exhaustive discussion on the coincidence between open-loop and closed-loop
memoryless solutions, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch.7).
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along with the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
µi(t)qi(t) = 0 (20)
and the initial conditions qi(0) = qi0 > 0, with qH0 > qL0.
Now, using (17), (15) and (16), we obtain:
xH =
1
2
(
θ + qH − δ2kH
)
(21)
xL =
1
2s
(
3
2
sθ +
1
2
sqH − sδkH + qL − 2δkL
)
(22)
which can be plugged into the state equations, simplifying as follows:
·
qH=
1
2
(
2kH + 2δ
2kH − δθ − δqH
)
(23)
·
qL=
1
4s
(
4kLs− δsθ + δsqH − 2sδ
2kH − 2δqL + 4δ
2kL
)
(24)
In order to characterize the dynamics of investment, we need to diﬀerentiate (17) w.r.t.
time:
·
λii= 2
·
ki (25)
By plugging (25), (17), (21) and (22) into the co-state equations, we get:
·
kH=
3
4
qH −
1
4
θ +
1
2
δkH + ρkH (26)
·
kL=
3
4
qL −
1
8
θ +
1
2
δkL + ρkL +
1
8
qH −
1
4
δkH (27)
The system
{
·
ki= 0,
·
qi= 0
}
yields the following steady states:
q∗H =
θ (1− 2δρ)
3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)
(28)
k∗H =
2δθ
3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)
(29)
q∗L =
sθ (1− 2δρ) [1 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]
[3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)] [4s− 1 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]
(30)
k∗L =
2sδθ [1 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]
[3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)] [4s− 1 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]
(31)
Proposition 1 The steady state deﬁned by {q∗H , k
∗
H , q
∗
L, k
∗
L} is stable along a saddle path.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The above candidates are acceptable as steady state solutions if and only if they belong
to the set of positive real numbers. By a direct inspection of the involved expressions, we
can write:
Lemma 1 q∗i ≥ 0 with i = {H,L} if
ρ ≤
1
2δ
while k∗i > 0 always.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. It suﬃces to note that 4s− 1 + 2δ(2δ + ρ) > 0, since
it has to be true that s > 1/4 for second order conditions to hold (see the Appendix). 
Now, we are in a position to derive the expressions of equilibrium quantities:
x∗H =
2θ
3 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
(32)
x∗L =
2sθ
(
1 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
)(
3 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
) (
4s− 1 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
) (33)
which are both positive in the entire admissible parameter range. Once noted that
q∗H
q∗L
=
k∗H
k∗L
=
x∗H
x∗L
(34)
the following can immediately be established:
Lemma 2 At the steady state, the high quality ﬁrm invests more in network capacity and
obtains a larger market share than the low quality ﬁrm.
The fact that q∗H > q
∗
L ⇒ x
∗
H > x
∗
L in the entire admissible parameter range, allows us to
simplify the algebra by setting s = 1. As to the comparison between quality levels, we have:
Lemma 3 q∗H ≥ q
∗
L always.
Proof. q∗H − q
∗
L ∝ 3s − 1 + 4δ
2 + 2δρ − 4sδ2 − 2sδρ. With s = 1 this expression simpliﬁes
to 2. 
Unlike the conventional wisdom coming from analyses based on multi-stage games, in
our dynamic framework the order relationship between equilibrium proﬁts is ambiguous.13
13A diﬀerential duopoly game where the low quality ﬁrm may perform better than the rival in terms of
equilibrium proﬁts is in Colombo and Lambertini (2003).
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To see this, we compute the steady state level of proﬁts accruing to ﬁrm H and to ﬁrm L,
respectively:
π∗H = −
{13 + 4δ [∆]} θ
2
[3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]4
(35)
with
∆ = −20ρ+ δ
{
5− 64δρ− 22ρ2 + 16δ3
[
δ
(
−1 + ρ2
)
− ρ
(
4− ρ2
)]
+ 4δ2
(
−1− 7ρ2 + ρ4
)}
π∗L =
θ
2
[1 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]2
[
3 + 4δρ+ 4δ2 (1− ρ2)
]
[3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]4
(36)
By substracting π∗L from π
∗
H we get:
π∗H − π
∗
L =
16
{
−1 + δ
[
4ρ+ δ
(
−3 + 10δρ+ 8δ3ρ+ 4ρ2 + 4δ2 (−1 + ρ2)
)]}
[3 + 2δ (2δ + ρ)]4
(37)
which, a priori, can take either sign.
Now, let us deﬁne ρ the admissible value of ρ such that π∗H = π
∗
L. From (37) we obtain:
ρ =
−2− 5δ2 − 4δ4 +
√
8 + 36δ2 + 69δ4 + 56δ6 + 16δ8
4δ
(
1 + δ2
) (38)
wich is always admissible, being 0 < ρ < 1/ (2δ). Moreover, let us deﬁne ρ˜ the value of ρ
such that π∗H = 0.
The sustainability of either the monopoly or the duopoly regime depends upon the non-
negativity of proﬁts. In this respect, we have:
Lemma 4 π∗L > 0 always; π
∗
H > 0 for all ρ > ρ˜, with ρ˜ ∈ (0, ρ) ∀ δ ∈ (0, 0.81832) and ρ˜ < 0
∀ δ ∈ (0.81832, 1).
Proof. From (36):
π∗L > 0 if ρ <
1
2δ
(
1 + 2
√(
1 + δ2
))
Since 1/ (2δ) (1 + 2
√
1 + δ2) > 1/ (2δ), and provided that, from Lemma 1, the admissible
range for ρ is ρ < 1/ (2δ), we have the result. The analytical expresion of ρ˜ is cumbersome,
therefore omitted. By taking limρ→0 (π
∗
H) = θ
2 (
−13− 20δ2 + 64δ6 + 16δ4
)
/
(
3 + 4δ2
)4
and
by evaluating the sign of the numerator, we can assess that for all δ ∈ (0.81832, 1) π∗H < 0
iﬀ ρ > ρ˜ < 0, therefore in this regime we have π∗H > 0 always. 
The above discussion yields our:
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Proposition 2 For all δ ∈ (0.81832, 1) the market is a natural duopoly; if ρ < ρ we have
0 < π∗H < π
∗
L, otherwise we have π
∗
H > π
∗
L > 0. For all δ ∈ (0, 0.81832) the market is
served by both ﬁrms iﬀ ρ > ρ˜, otherwise the low quality ﬁrm becomes a natural monopolist;
if ρ ∈ (ρ˜, ρ) we have 0 < π∗H < π
∗
L, otherwise we have 0 < π
∗
L < π
∗
H.
The following ﬁgure illustrates the above proposition:
Figure 1 : Parameter Space


δ
ρ
A : π∗H > π
∗
L > 0
B : 0 < π∗H < π
∗
L
C : 0 = π∗H < π
∗
L
A
B
C
0.8183
ρ
ρ˜
1
2δ
Within area A, we ﬁnd the traditional static result on product quality provision in oligopoly;
within area B, although the market is still served by both ﬁrms, the order relationship
between proﬁts is reversed; ﬁnally, what we register within area C, is that the market
becomes a natural monopoly, with only the low quality ﬁrm being active. This, is in contrast
with the so called finitess property (Shaked and Sutton, 1983), according to which if only
one ﬁrm can earn positive proﬁts while supplying a vertically diﬀerentiated good, such a ﬁrm
will be the one providing the highest (technically producible) quality level. Not surprisingly,
in our dynamic model, the sustainability of a duopoly regime crucially depends upon the
intertemporal parameters, δ and ρ. If the decay rate is suﬃciently high, implying that
congestion phenomena are suﬃciently important, we expect the market to be a natural
duopoly regardless of discounting. If, on the other hand, congestion eﬀects are very small,
we expect the market to be served only by the low quality ﬁrm. Therefore, we can conclude
that, in the long run, congestion is pro-competitive.
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4. Full Cooperative Play
In this section, we assume that the two competitors decide to implement a full cartelization
rule, that is, to act so as to maximize the present value of joint proﬁts14 The relevant current
value Hamiltonian function writes:
H(t) = e−ρt
[
πH(t) + πL(t) + λH(t)
·
qH +λL(t)
·
qL
]
(39)
By applying Pontryaguin’s Maximum Principle, ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂HH
∂xH
= 0⇒ xH =
1
2
θ +
1
2
qH −
1
2
xL −
1
2
λHδ (40)
∂HH
∂xL
= 0⇒ xL =
1
4
qL +
1
4
θ −
1
4
xH −
1
4
λLδ (41)
∂HH
∂kH
= 0⇒ λH = 2kH (42)
∂HH
∂kL
= 0⇒ λL = 2kL (43)
∂HH
∂qH
= xH − 2qH = ρλH−
·
λH (44)
∂HH
∂qH
= xL − 2qL = ρλL−
·
λL (45)
along with the same transversality and initial conditions as in duopoly. From the above
conditions, we obtain the following dynamic system:
·
kH= ρkH + qH −
xH
2
(46)
·
kL= ρkL +
6
7
qL −
1
14
θ +
1
14
qH +
2
7
kLδ −
1
7
kHδ (47)
·
qH= kH − δ
3
7
δθ −
4
7
δqH +
1
7
δqL −
1
7
2kLδ
2 +
4
7
2kHδ
2 (48)
·
qL= kL −
2
7
δqL −
1
7
δθ +
1
7
δqH +
4
7
kLδ
2 −
2
7
kHδ
2 (49)
whose steady state point is deﬁned as follows:
k∗∗H =
2δθ
(
4δ2 + 2δρ+ 5
)
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(50)
14For models where R&D in product quality improvements is activated by joint ventures, see Motta (1992)
and Rosenkranz (1995).
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k∗∗L =
2δθ
(
4δ2 + 1 + 2δρ
)
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(51)
q∗∗H =
θ (1− 2δρ)
(
4δ2 + 5 + 2δρ
)
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(52)
q∗∗L =
θ (1− 2δρ)
(
4δ2 + 1 + 2δρ
)
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(53)
From Lemma 1, the above solutions are always non negative in the admissible parameter
range.
Proposition 3 The steady state deﬁned by {k∗∗H , k
∗∗
L , q
∗∗
H , q
∗∗
L } is stable along a saddle path.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As to equilibrium quantities, we have:
x∗∗H = 2θ
4δ2 + 2δρ+ 5
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(54)
x∗∗L = 2θ
4δ2 + 1 + 2δρ
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
(55)
Notice that, as in duopoly, k∗∗H /k
∗∗
L = x
∗∗
H /x
∗∗
L = q
∗∗
H /q
∗∗
L , implying that k
∗∗
H > k
∗∗
L and
x∗∗H > x
∗∗
L . Therefore, Lemma 2 can be extended to the case in which ﬁrms behave coopera-
tively. By comparing the above solutions with those arising in duopoly, we can write:
Proposition 4 k∗∗i < k
∗
i , x
∗∗
i < x
∗
i , q
∗∗
i < q
∗
i , with i = {H,L}, provided that the duopoly
regime be sustainable.
Proof. It suﬃces to make a direct comparison between the involved expressions. As to
qualities, we have (q∗∗i − q
∗
i ) ∝ (−1 + 2δρ). Since, from Lemma 1, ρ < 1/(2δ), the sign is
negative. 
Corollary 1 x∗∗i < x
∗
i ⇒ CS
∗∗ < CS∗, i = {H,L}. At the steady state, consumers are
better oﬀ under duopoly than under full cartelization regime, provided that the duopoly regime
be sustainable.
When the duopoly regime is not sustainable (see Proposition 2), only the low quality
ﬁrm survives and (13) becomes CS(t) = x3L/2. Under full cartelization, using equilibrium
quantities, the equilibrium level of consumers’ surplus turns out to be:
CS∗∗ = 32θ
364δ4 + 50δ2 + 25δρ+ 16δ2ρ2 + 64δ3ρ+ 48δ5ρ+ 32δ6 + 24δ4ρ2 + 4δ3ρ3 + 17(
20δρ+ 40δ2 + 17 + 4δ2ρ2 + 16δ3ρ+ 16δ4
)3
(56)
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while, under non cooperative play (in case of natural monopoly), we obtain:
CS∗ =
1
2
[
2θ
(
1 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
)(
3 + 4δ2 + 2δρ
)2
]3
(57)
By a direct comparison between (56) and (57) we can establish our:
Proposition 5 When the duopoly regime is not sustainable, there exists an admissible subset
of parameters {θ, δ, ρ} wherein CS∗∗ > CS∗.
As an illustration, a numerical example is provided in the Appendix.
5. Concluding Remarks
We have investigated a diﬀerential duopoly game with vertical diﬀerentiation and network
externalities and focussed on the steady state properties of the system. Unlike multi-stage
games, diﬀerential games are particularly suitable to shed light on the deep nature of in-
vestments, which is inherently a dynamic one. Another novelty of our approach has been to
jointly deal with both the positive and the negative side of network externalities. It seems
to us that these two main departures from the existing relevant literature, represents a step
ahead in the comprehension of the nature and the eﬀects of ﬁrms investments on the Web.
The main result obtained in our paper is that, in contrast with the acquired wisdom
based on static models, the low quality ﬁrm may earn higher equilibrium proﬁts than the
high quality ﬁrm. The intuition of this result lies in the fact that, whenever active, the high
quality ﬁrm sells always more than the rival, leading to more relevant congestion eﬀects on
its infrastructures. In order not to let its quality decreasing, the ﬁrm supplying the superior
variety has to devote more resources to building up network capacity. Indeed, in the long
run equilibrium, it may be more proﬁtable to provide the market with the inferior quality
than otherwise. Furthermore, in contrast with the so called finitess property (Shaked and
Sutton, 1983), we have shown the low quality ﬁrm may become a natural monopolist.
The duopoly regime has been compared with the full cartelization regime. In this respect,
we have shown that the multi-product cartel invests less, sells less, and provides lower quality
levels of both varieties than the duopoly does, implying that consumers are better oﬀ under
non cooperative play. However, one important remark is in order. The superiority of the
non cooperative play in terms of consumers well-being requires that duopoly be sustainable.
When congestion eﬀects are very small, only the low quality ﬁrm may survive. In this case,
the relevant comparison between non cooperative and cooperative play involves a single-
product monopolist and a multi-product monopolist, respectively. Quite surprisingly, we
14
have found that it may be socially desirable to let the market be served by the multi-product
cartel.
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Appendix
Stability
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the system composed by (10) in combination with
(26) and (27).The resulting dynamic system can be written in matrix form as follows:

·
qH
·
kH
·
qL
·
kL
 =

−
δ
2
(
1 + δ2
)
0 0
3
4
1
2
(δ + 2ρ) 0 0
δ
4
−
δ2
2
−
δ
2
1 + δ2
1
8
−
δ
4
1−
1
4
ρ+
δ
2


qH
kH
qL
kL
+

0
−
θ
4
−
δθ
4
−
θ
8

By computing the four eigenvalues, it is easy to assess that two eigenvalues are positive
while two eigenvalues are negative. Hence the equilibrium is a saddle point.
Proof of Proposition 3. We consider the dynamic system (46-49), which can be written
in matrix form as follows:

·
qH
·
kH
·
qL
·
kL
 =

−
4δ
7
(
1 +
8δ2
7
)
δ
7
−
2δ2
7
1−
2
7
ρ+
4
7
δ
1
14
−
1
7
δ
1δ
7
−
2δ2
7
−
2δ
7
1 +
4δ2
7
1
14
−
1δ
7
6
7
ρ+
2δ
7


qH
kH
qL
kL
+

−
3δθ
7
−
3θ
14
−
δθ
7
−
θ
14

By computing the four eigenvalues, as before, we ﬁnd that two are negative while two
are positive, implying saddle path stability.
Suﬃcient Conditions
Suﬃciency (Arrow) for the duopoly:
Using Arrow’s suﬃciency theorem:
∂2HH
(
xOH , k
O
H
)
∂2qH
= −
3
2
∂2HL
(
xOL , k
O
L
)
∂2qL
=
1− 4s
2s
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where x0i and k
0
i denote optimal control expressions. While s.o.c. are always satisﬁed for
ﬁrm H, as to ﬁrm L we need s > 1/4.
Suﬃciency (Arrow) for the full cartelization:
The relevant Hessian metrix is
∂2H
(
xOi , k
O
i
)
∂2qH
= −
10
7
∂2H
(
xOi , k
O
i
)
∂qHqL
= −
1
7
∂2H
(
xOi , ki
)
∂qLqH
= −
1
7
∂2H
(
xOi , k
O
i
)
∂2qL
= −
12
7

which is negative deﬁnite.
Numerical Examples
Duopoly regime:
δ =
1
10
, ρ = 2, θ =
11
10
π∗L = 0.06594, π
∗
H = 0.05921, q
∗
H = 0.19186, q
∗
L = 0.08031, x
∗
H = 0.63953, x
∗
L = 0.26771, k
∗
H =
0.06395, k∗L = 0.02677, p
∗
H = 0.54027, p
∗
L = 0.27307, ρ = 1.39045, ρ˜ = 2.08458.
δ =
15
100
, ρ = 1, θ =
12
10
π∗L = 0.07584, π
∗
H = 0.01598, q
∗
H = 0.24779, q
∗
L = 0.1016, x
∗
H = 0.70796, x
∗
L = 0.29029, k
∗
H =
0.10619, k∗L = 0.04354, p
∗
H = 0. 6208, p
∗
L = 0.30335, ρ = 1.40118, ρ˜ = 0.9124.
Welfare comparison between single- and multi-product monopolist:
δ =
5
100
, ρ =
1
2
, θ =
11
10
π∗L = 0.04819, CS
∗ = 0.00515, CS∗∗ = 0. 1387, W ∗ = 0.05334.
CS∗∗ > W ∗ ⇒W ∗∗ > W ∗.
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